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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JEANNIE STRINGAM,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
MORRIS MYERS

v.
Case No. 20000179-CA
MORRIS MYERS, ERIN M. STOVALL,
aka ERIN M. STOVALL, JOHN
PATRICK STOVALL,

Priority No* 15

Defendants and Appellant.

An important purpose of findings of fact is to provide a
basis for review bv the appellate court."

Tavlor v. Estate

of Tavlor. 770 P.2d 163, 168 (Utah App. 1989)
[An appellate court will disturb the

lower court's

decision only if the findings are clearly erroneous. Clearly
erroneous is defined by whether the findings are against the
clear

weight

of

the

evidence, whether

the

lower

court

correctly apprehended the evidence, or if the appellate court
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.

State ex rel. C.R. . 996 P.2d 1059 (Utah App. 2000);

Citv of Bozeman v. Vaneman, 898 P.2d 1208, 1210-11 (Mont.
1995).]
As shown following, as well as in appellant Myers'
opening brief, plaintiff Stringam's findings and judgment
which rest upon those findings must be set aside because said
findings are clearly erroneous in that the record is devoid of
facts and inferences to support the findings and the judgment

appealed is unsupported by the findings.
1. The trial court's finding of fact #39 states: lf[t]he
language in the contract is ambiguous;11 finding #12 states:
11

[t]he agreement was so unclear that it reguired judicial

interpretation as to how to compute the balance due."
Stringam, at page 40 of her brief, contends that
,f

[t]he District Court correctly determined that the agreement

is ambiguous

and

therefore,

properly

admitted

extrinsic

evidence to interpret the agreement."
In its findings of fact the trial court fails to identify
two plausible interpretations of any operative clause in the
agreement [and did not explain how the Agreement was unclear
so as to be ambiguous]; this the trial court must do in order
to

conclude

that

the

agreement

is

ambiguous.

Hoffman

Construction Company v. Fred S. James Co. , 313 Or. 464, 836
P.2d 703 (1992).

The language in the Agreement must be

construed in the context of that instrument as a whole, and in
the circumstances of that case, and cannot be found to be
ambiguous in the abstract. Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. Nat. Union
Fire

Ins., 959

P.2d

265,

272-73

(Cal.

1998);

Ward

v.

Intermountain Farmers Ass'n, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995)
2.

Appellee's brief, at pp. 40-41, " . . .

consistently

asserted

that

the

Agreement

was

Stringam
a

lease

containing an option to buy. . . and "[b]oth Stringam and Erin
Stovall, the only two original parties to the Agreement,
testified that the Agreement was a lease/purchase agreement.11

2

"In the usual case, the instrument alone will be deemed
to express the intention of the parties for it is objective,
not subjective, intent that controls."

Watkins v. Petro-

Searchf Inc. P 689 F.2d 537, 538 (5th Cir. 1992); Sun Oil
Co.(Delaware) v. Madelev, 626 W.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. 1981).
Both Stringam's and Erin Stovall's testimony, summarized
above, only expresses their subjective intent.
Also, to raise an issue of credibility relative to both
women, Stringam#s interest is to establish the Agreement as a
lease/purchase

agreement

to

facilitate

her

getting

the

property for half its value. ["The courts are to be guided by
the overriding general policy, as Mr. Justice Holmes put it,
*of preventing people from getting other people's property for
nothing when they purport to be buying it.'" Kelly v. Kosucra,
358 U.S. 516, 520-21, 79 S.Ct. 429, 430-31, 3 L.Ed.2d 475
(1959)(quoting Continental Wall Paper Company v. Louis Voighy
& Sons Company, 212 U.S. 227, 271, 29 S.Ct. 280, 296, 53 L.Ed.

486 (1909) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
Erin Stovall's interest is to establish the Agreement as
a sale agreement so that she may participate in the sale
proceeds in accordance with the provisions of her divorce
decree.
3. Stringara then states in her appellee's brief, pp. 4041, that the quoted provisions of the agreement, i.e., "this
joint

venture

contemplates

the purchase

by

First

Party

[Stringam] from Second Party [Erin Stovall] of said property

3

for $109,000* * • ."

*

*

* "Second party [Erin Stovall]

agrees to sell and First Party [Stringam] agrees to buy said
real property ." and

lf

*

*

* [f]inally, on page four,

paragraph number 11, the Agreement describes the distribution
of the proceeds in excess of $109,000 if the Home is sold.",
compel

the

interpretation

by

the

trial

court

above

is,

that

the

Agreement is one of lease/purchase*
Out

of

context,

which

the

interpretation cannot be denied.

Stringam's

In context, and with the

inclusion of the fourth recital ("Whereas, First Party and
Second Party intend hereby to state their intentions and
agreement as to the entitlement to and distribution of profits
in the event of sale of said property which is the ultimate
purpose

of

this

joint

venture,.

.

."),

however,

the

interpretation urged by Stringam would serve to defeat the
intent and ultimate purpose of the Agreement as expressed in
the

Agreement;

enriched.

and

whereby

Stringam

would

be

unjustly

[Stringam also fails to explain how Stovall's

agreement to pay taxes and insurance while Stringam has all
the benefits of ownership of the property supports her theory
of sale.]

To explain further, if Stringam is permitted to

purchase the property for $109,000 free of the obligations
under the

joint venture arrangement,

in accordance with

paragraph 3., then there would be nothing for the joint
venture to sell (". . .in the event of sale of said property
which is the ultimate purpose of this joint venture.").

4

The language of the Agreement by itself establishes the
intent of the parties. Redel's Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 498
F.2d 95, 100 and n. 6 (5th Cir. 1974). The applicable rule of
construction is that unambiguous language in a contract should
be enforced as written.

Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Madelayf

626 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex.1981); Eie v. St. Benedicts Hosp.f
638 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1981). Ordinarily, where the terms of a
contract are freely agreed upon by the parties, the court's
duty is to enforce the contract. Hubbard v. Albuquerque Truck
CenterP Ltd * , 958 P. 2d 111

(N.M. App 1998)

Stringam's

contention therefore, that the trial court properly denied
appellant Myers' post-trial motions (r. 955 et seq.) does not
square with the rule as quoted.
4.

Relative to Stringam's contention that the trial

court properly allowed Stringam to tender the balloon payment
to the court during the pendency of the action is no longer a
consideration.

On December

8, 1997 the trial court at

Stringam's request, entered an order providing that "Plaintiff
may withdraw her tender of $109,000 from the Court" which she
did on December 16, 1997, by receipting for and receiving the
$109,000 she deposited with the court, (r. 164-166).
Presumably, through simple mathematical calculation, the
trial court determined the balloon payment to be $134,043.24
(r. 1000)
5. In interpreting a contract "we first look to the four
corners of the document to determine the intent of the

5

parties.
6;

Wade v. Stanol. 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994).
On the matter of attorney's fees, an award of

attorney's fees must be based on evidence of reasonableness of
the requested fees. Both the decision to award such fees and
the amount of such fees are within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Crouse v. Grouse, 817 P.2d 836 (Utah App. 1991).
"Attorney fees are awardable only if expressly contracted for,
or provided
necessity

by statute and

and

if there

reasonableness

of

said

Sandwickf 548 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1976).

is evidence as to
fees."

Walke

Findings are required*

Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 168 n* 6.
App* 1989)

Also,

v.

(Utah

Stringam has provided no evidence of

necessity and reasonablenes of the requested fees and has
failed to claim her costs as the rule requires [rule 54(d)(2),
URCiP]; they are therefore waived.

Frampton v. Wilson, 605

P.2d 771 (Utah 1980).
7.

(A)

At page 46 of her appellee's brief, Stringam

then states that she is permitted an appeal from the January
31, 2000, and February 4, 2000, orders and judgments, and that
appellant Myers cannot now question in his appellant's brief
her right to do so.
Myers' raises a jurisdictional issue with respect to the
February 4, 2000 order and judgment which can be raised at any
time.
(B)

Stringam states as one of the issues on appeal

that the failure of the trial court to find that Stringam's

6

attorney fees were unreasonable in face of the trial court's
reduction of Stringam's award of attorney's fees, was error.
To the knowledge of the undersigned, there is no record of the
trial court having considered this issue at trial or by motion
for new trial/ rule 59(e) motion, or otherwise. And Stringam,
at least on this record, did not request finding(s) on the
issue.

An appellate court should not consider Stringam's

argument on this issue therefore, because it is raised for the
first time on appeal. Straley v. Halliday,

2000 Ut.App. 38,

997 P.2d 338.
Insofar as paragraph 4. of the trial court's January 31,
2000 order and judgment is concerned, the same did not specify
the legal basis for the amount of the award nor how the court
arrived at the precise amount of the award.
8. On August 1, 2000, appellant Myers submitted a letter
of

supplemental

authority

which

may

be

helpful

in the

determination of intent regarding a joint venture enterprise.
It is not intended to be misleading or to be presented outside
the issues of appellant Myers' appeal.
In

addition,

Stringam

did

not

file

a response

to

appellant Myers' suplemental authority within seven days as
the rule requires and therefor has waived any objection she
might have.

See rule 24(i), URAppP.

9. At page 33 of her appellee's brief, Stringam urges the
appellate court to dismiss appellant Myers' appeal "for lack
of juris^iq^ion because Myers' service of his notice on
7

Stringam was faulty."
Stringam attacks Myers appeal on purported jurisdictional
grounds, viz.,

". • •Myers waited a few days [after filing his

notice of appeal] to mail the Notice to Stringam. . .and Myers
did not include a certificate of service with his notice of
appeal." (appellee's brief, at p. 33-34)

Stringam does not

explain how she was prejudiced by the omissions she describes.
Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides "*
* *. Failure of an appellant to take any step other than the
timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the
validity of the appeal, *

*

*"

The grounds asserted by

Stringam as jurisdictional for dismissal of appellant's appeal
do not, therefore, appear to be jurisdictional.
DATED October 28, 2000.
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